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COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION FOR THE
DISADVANTAGED: VARIATIONS IN
PROBLEMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Ann Southworth*
INTRODUCTION
C RITICS of civil rights and poverty lawyers sometimes suggest
that lawyers who venture away from individual representation to
pursue collective ends for disadvantaged clients risk betraying mem-
bers of the groups they purport to serve.' Inherent in collective work,
some say, is the opportunity and temptation for lawyers to gloss over
deep conflicts within represented groups and to substitute their own
understanding of the collective good for the client's actual prefer-
ences.2 This Article draws on an empirical study of civil rights and
poverty lawyers to identify variations in accountability problems that
lawyers confront in representing groups and to suggest that these
problems are much less pressing in some types of collective represen-
tation than in others. It examines structural factors that may help pre-
dict accountability problems in collective projects. Other scholars
have offered theoretical justifications for tailoring lawyers' ethics to
the particular practice contexts in which lawyers work and the circum-
stances of their relationships with clients.' This Article presents em-
* Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. Thanks to my
colleagues, Robert Lawry and Kevin McMunigal, whose fine questions about an ear-
lier draft deserve better answers than the ones provided here.
1. See Charles K. Rowley, The Right to Justice: The Political Economy of Legal
Services in the United States 246 (1992) (asserting that legal services for the poor
"should be orientated to individual clients, concerned with individual cases, and fo-
cused on the routine disorders of daily life" and should eschew all work directed to-
ward law reform); Marshall J. Breger, Accountability and the Adjudication of the
Public Interest, 8 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 349, 353 (1985) (criticizing a view he attrib-
utes to some public interest lawyers: "[L]ook, we can't expect client consent in a large
group case, whether it be a Rule 23 case or some other kind of group action. We can't
expect to accommodate the needs and concerns of all the individuals we are repre-
senting .... "); see also Kenney Hegland, Beyond Enthusiasm and Commitnzent, 13
Ariz. L. Rev. 805, 811 (1971) (asserting that the attorney's role "is to help others not
as interests, but as individuals").
2. David Luban has described these as the "two distinct representation relations
at work in public interest law practice": (1) the representation of groups by their
spokespersons in consultations with lawyers; and (2) lawyers' representation of
groups in interactions with third parties. David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethi-
cal Study 344-45 (1988).
3. See, eg., John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 825, 841 (1992) (arguing for "a functional or balancing approach, in which
each situation, or small class of situations, would be separately considered in light of
the relevant interests and policies"); James Gray Pope, Two Faces, Two Ethics: Labor
Union Lawyers and the Emerging Doctrine of Entity Ethics, 68 Or. L. Rev. 1, 54
(1989) (asserting that lawyers for labor unions should adhere to different rules than
lawyers for corporations and endorsing a multi-factor test for determining the duties
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pirical support for such a differentiated approach with respect to
collective practice for disadvantaged clients.
Lawyers serving poor people have been attracted to collective ap-
proaches to stretch resources, to increase their clients' leverage with
third-parties, and to help clients build alliances. Aggregating claims
sometimes increases access to the legal system for individuals who
otherwise would be unable to find representation.4 Achieving sys-
temic change benefiting large numbers of people often is more effi-
cient than seeking redress for each of many aggrieved individuals.'
Moreover, claims that might alone seem trivial to a defendant or a
policymaker acquire greater significance when asserted on behalf of
groups.6 In projects not involving litigation, groups sometimes can ob-
tain collective goods that they would be unable to secure individually.7
Helping groups of people form and sustain organizations and pursue
collective projects through those organizations enables disadvantaged
clients to achieve common ends and build political power.8
Collective representation takes various forms. A lawyer represent-
ing one person may pursue a precedent or an injunction affecting
many people. In such actions, the client is the individual, but the law-
yer may regard her work as directed toward social change for a con-
stituency.9 Lawyers may represent individuals who together pursue a
of lawyers for different types of organizations); David B. Wilkins, Making Context
Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1145, 1218-20
(1993) (arguing in favor of "middle-level" rules that take into account differences
among lawyers and the contexts in which they practice).
4. See Marie A. Failinger & Larry May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Serv-
ices and Group Representation, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 28 (1984); Bryant G. Garth, Con-
flict and Dissent in Class Actions: A Suggested Perspective, 77 Nw. U.L. Rev. 492, 526
(1982); Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action: Part II Interest,
Class, and Representation, 27 UCLA L. Rev. 1067, 1089 (1980) [hereinafter Yeazell,
From Group Litigation].
5. See Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1183,
1186 (1982).
6. See John T. Holmstrem, Comment, Allocation of Initial Notice Costs Under
Federal Rule 23(c)(2), 1973 U. Ill. L.F. 723, 723-24.
7. See Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the
Theory of Groups 7 (1965).
8. See Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy
and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78
Va. L. Rev. 1103, 1106 (1992) ("The success of [legal] strategies ... may depend on
the extent to which [public interest lawyers] empower clients outside as well as inside
the courts, and so may hinge on the degree to which they transform this multiplicity of
people into a group."); Alan W. Houseman, Community Group Action: Legal Serv-
ices, Poor People and Community Groups, 19 Clearinghouse Rev. 392, 400 (1985)
("[N]ew relationships must be forged with poor people's groups-both existing
groups and those that are newly emerging."); Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for
Poor People, 79 Yale L.J. 1049, 1053 (1970) ("[Tihe lawyer must seek to strengthen
existing organizations of poor people and to help poor people start organizations
where none exist.").
9. See Hegland, supra note 1, at 806 ("[T]he public interest practitioner, to in-
crease his effectiveness, attempts to assert generalized interests rather than specific
2450 [Vol. 67
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common objective in litigation or legislative advocacy without identi-
fying themselves as a group for any other purpose. Clients and their
lawyers may seek remedies on behalf of a plaintiff class. Groups also
may form organizations which themselves launch projects, including
litigation, on behalf of the organization itself or its members.10
Lawyers in all types of collective representation face ethical dilem-
mas regarding their clients' identities and conflicts within the groups
they represent," but civil rights and poverty lawyers' ethical predica-
ments in collective practice have received particularly critical scru-
tiny. 2 When public interest lawyers pursue law reform litigation on
behalf of individuals, do they owe exclusive fealty to the individual
client or may they properly seek to benefit third parties as well?13 If
lawyers seek to represent a constituency or a cause rather than just an
interests."); Kevin C. McMunigal, Of Causes and Clients: Two Tales of Roe v. Wade,
47 Hastings Li. 779, 783 (1996) (describing how the lawyer who represented Jane
Roe in Roe v. Wade regarded herself as a representative of a large constituency of
American women); Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989
U. Ill. L. Rev. 43, 55 [hereinafter Yeazell, Collective Litigation] (asserting that "fejven
when the NAACP's litigation did not take the form of class actions, the organization
served less the interest of particular black plaintiffs than those of black Americans
generally"); cf John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest
Litigation, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 888-907 (1975) (challenging the practice of awarding
attorneys' fees in public interest litigation where the award is based on the rationale
that members of the public, rather than the individual clients, are the beneficiaries).
10. An organization may represent itself in an organization qua organization suit
or it may represent its members in an organizational representation or associational
standing suit, in which the organization stands in the shoes of its members. See Dale
Gronemeier, From Net to Sword: Organizational Representatives Litigating Their
Members' Claims, 1974 U. Ill. L.F. 663, 663-64.
11. For scholarship examining such conflicts in corporate practice, see generally
Charles A. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 8.3, at 421-28 (1986); Ralph Jonas, Who
Is the Client?: The Corporate Lawyer's Dilemma, 39 Hastings L.J. 617 (1988); Stanley
A. Kaplan, Some Ruminations on the Role of Counsel for a Corporation, 56 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 873 (1980); and George D. Reycraft, Conflicts of Interest and Effective
Representation: The Dilemma of Corporate Counsel, 39 Hastings L.J. 605 (1988). For
an analysis of conflicts in the representation of unions, see generally Pope, supra note
3.
12. The most influential of these was Derrick Bell's critique of the NAACP's role
in desegregation litigation and its response to conflicts among black parents in the
plaintiff classes about how to improve educational opportunity for their children. Der-
rick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470 (1976). For other examples of articles high-
lighting problems of conflicts and lawyer accountability in public interest representa-
tion, see generally Breger, supra note 1; Garth, supra note 4; Hegland, supra note 1;
and Rhode, supra note 5.
For an argument that conflicts in groups of disadvantaged individuals have received
far more critical attention than conflicts within corporate entities, see William H. Si-
mon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Schol-
arship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. Miami L. Rev. 1099, 1103-04, 1114
(1994) [hereinafter Simon, Progressive Lawyering].
13. See Jerold Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern
America 267-69 (1976) (describing how civil rights lawyers wrestled with "whether
their client was, as traditional professional precepts dictated, a solitary party to a dis-
crete case-or ... a cause larger than any client"); Breger, supra note 1, at 349 (as-
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individual client, who speaks for that constituency or cause? How
should conflicts between the individual and the constituency, or within
that constituency, be resolved? 14 When law reform litigation produces
precedents affecting persons who are not parties, does the lawyer owe
any duty to those affected nonparties?" When asked to represent a
group, how should a lawyer discern the interests and preferences of
that group when it lacks formal decisionmaking procedures?16 In in-
junctive class actions, how should the lawyer discern the interests of
class members17 and how should she respond to conflicts within the
class? 18
Current ethics doctrine does not adequately address how lawyers
should manage these issues of client autonomy and conflicts of inter-
ests in representing groups. Most provisions of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility simply assume that the client is an individual. The rules of ethics
require loyalty to individual clients and prohibit lawyers from allowing
other interests, including their own, to interfere with their duties to
those individuals.' 9 A lawyer may represent multiple individuals if
serting that in public interest practice "it is the attorney's understanding of an
ideological cause or his position that becomes his client").
14. See McMunigal, supra note 9, at 800-01 (criticizing Jane Roe's lawyer's pursuit
of abortion rights for women at the expense of her client's interest in obtaining an
abortion).
15. See Failinger & May, supra note 4, at 29 (stating that "the precedential impact
of an individual lawsuit may affect the interests of other poor persons who are not
heard in the suit" and that overly narrow definitions of the plaintiff class "may ex-
clude participation of people who have legitimate interests in the outcome of the
suit"); Garth, supra note 4, at 499-500 (asserting that the accountability problems in
class actions also plague individual actions in which plaintiffs seek broad injunctive
relief); William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among
Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 Yale L.J. 1623, 1625
(1997) (arguing that "our rules of civil procedure and professional ethics promote
individualist decisionmaking, even where the consequences of litigative decisions af-
fect entire groups of people"); see also Rhode, supra note 5, at 1195-97 (noting that
those who disagree with a remedial request may be better off if the claim proceeds as
a class action rather than an individual claim because they will receive slightly better
opportunities for notice and participation).
16. See Ellmann, supra note 8, at 1110-11.
17. See Bell, supra note 12, at 470-72; Rhode, supra note 5, at 1232-42; Yeazell,
From Group Litigation, supra note 4, at 1115-16; see also Luban, supra note 2, at 341-
57 (arguing that lawyers are obliged to resort to their own values when clients' wishes
are impossible to discern, either because the class is too large, because class members
are not mobilized and informed, or because the project affects future generations'
interests).
18. See Wolfram, supra note 11, § 8.14, at 492-93; Rhode, supra note 5, at 1183-86:
Yeazell, Collective Litigation, supra note 9, at 43.
19. Rule 1.7(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or
to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be ad-
versely affected; and
2452 [Vol. 67
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she reasonably believes that the representation of those individuals
will not be adversely affected and the clients consent to her represent-
ing them all,2' but the clients in such representation remain the indi-
viduals rather than the group and the rules generally discourage joint
representation.2' The rules allow lawyers to represent individuals
with conflicting interests as an intermediary only in certain narrow
circumstances. 2 Where the client is an organization, the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, adopted by most states, squeeze organiza-
tions into the individual representation model by adopting the "entity
theory" of representation, 3 whereby lawyers are to treat the entity,
rather than any of its particular members or constituencies, as the cli-
ent. 4 Under this approach, lawyers generally look to the officers of
an organization for guidance about the client's interests and wishes. 5
(2) the client consents after consultation ....
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b) (1998). The American Bar Associ-
ation's Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides: "Neither [a lawyer's]
personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should
be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client." Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility EC 5-1 (1980). The Model Code also provides that "the authority to make deci-
sions is exclusively that of the client and, if made within the framework of the law,
such decisions are binding on his lawyer." Id. EC 7-7.
20. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-105(c); Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.7. For a comprehensive discussion of the loyalty and
confidentiality provisions that apply to the representation of several individuals, see
Ellmann, supra note 8, at 1113-15.
21. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 224
(1941); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 40 (1931);
supra notes 19-20.
22. The rules allow a lawyer to represent groups of individuals with conflicting
interests as an "intermediary" if the lawyer has each client's consent and if she rea-
sonably believes that
the matter can be resolved on terms compatible with the clients' best inter-
ests, that each client will be able to make adequately informed decisions in
the matter and that there is little risk of material prejudice to the interests of
any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.2(a)(2). For a discussion of the many
ambiguities in Model Rule 2.2, see John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries:
The Representation of Multiple Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. I11. L.
Rev. 741, 741-48.
23. See Wolfram, supra note 11, § 13.7, at 735 ("The entity-as-client concept of
corporate representation can be understood as an attempt to fit corporate clients into
molds originally cast for individual clients.").
24. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A
Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct § 1.13:102, at 387 (2d ed.
1995) ("The basic precept of Rule 1.13 is that a lawyer representing an entity client
does not thereby (and without more) become the lawyer for any of the entity's mem-
bers, agents, officers, or other 'constituents,' as they are referred to in the rule; the
lawyer instead represents the entity itself.").
25. See Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 827-28.
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The Model Rules do not differentiate among types of organizations,2 6
and they hardly even mention class actions.27
This Article argues for an approach to defining lawyers' ethical obli-
gations when representing groups that recognizes differences, not only
between individual and collective representation, but also among dif-
ferent types of collective representation. Although there may be cer-
tain common benefits in all forms of collective representation, these
types of lawyering differ in important respects-particularly in terms
of lawyers' power vis-A-vis clients, the reliability of the decisionmak-
ing methods employed by groups, and members' opportunities to exit.
While injunctive class action litigation almost always raises difficult
problems of accountability,' and while law reform litigation on behalf
of individuals frequently does as well,29 these issues are far less promi-
nent in the representation of organizations whose internal governance
structures generate decisions on behalf of the group. The more indi-
vidual clients are able to hold accountable the groups in which they
participate and the lawyers who represent them, the less we need to
worry about lawyers' power to suppress conflict and to speak for those
groups.
This Article also urges attention to attractive aspects of lawyers'
roles in building institutions serving disadvantaged people and cau-
tions against treating all collective work as threatening to individual
client autonomy. In this study, lawyering for organizations was more
common than class action litigation, and lawyers for organizations
generally said that their clients participated more actively in setting
goals and strategy than did clients who were individuals or plaintiff
classes. Lawyers who represented organizations also often reported
that they facilitated the groups' organizing efforts and improved orga-
26. The Comment to Model Rule 1.13 states that "[t]he duties defined in this
Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations." Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.13 cmt. Some influential commentators have concluded that the term
"organization" includes even very informal groups who come together only for the
purpose of pursuing a lawsuit. See Hazard & Hodes, supra note 24, § 1.13:203, at 407.
27. For a few unenlightening references, see Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility DR 2-104(A)(5); and Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.2 cmt.
Similarly, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not offer much gui-
dance. It requires that "the claims or defenses of the representative parties" be "typi-
cal" of those of the class, and that the "representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3), (4).
28. Some have argued that the representativeness problems in injunctive class ac-
tions are inescapable. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 5, at 1242-43 ("[T]he problem of
class action conflicts is ... to a considerable extent, intractable.").
29. For arguments that law reform litigation on behalf of individuals is often prob-
lematic, see Breger, supra note 1, at 349 ("[I]n many instances in public interest law
cases, the client is more fictional than real.... In those instances, there are no con-
straints on an attorney's behavior except those which he chooses to impose upon him-
self."); Rubenstein, supra note 15, at 1645-46 (criticizing as incoherent our
individualistic civil litigation model, which allows any individual to pursue law reform
litigation on behalf of herself alone while at the same time binding all similarly situ-
ated individuals to a particular legal position through the doctrine of stare decisis).
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nizational operations. Far from threatening poor people's capacities
to organize, the lawyers in this study who represented organizations
appeared to contribute toward that end. The data described here sug-
gest that lawyers sometimes can help poor clients build and sustain
institutions (and thereby build and consolidate power) without usurp-
ing the client group's prerogative to define goals."
I. COMPARING FORMS OF COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION
In 1993 and 1994, I conducted interviews with sixty-nine lawyers
who worked on civil rights and poverty issues in Chicago to learn
about their work and relationships with clients.31 Many of the clients
described by lawyers in this study were groups rather than individuals,
and, therefore, this study invites attention to differences among these
types of group representation.
The definition of collective representation is problematic here. Are
individuals who pursue litigation together individuals or groups? How
should we characterize married couples, families, coalitions, and con-
stituencies? When, if ever, is the lawyer who pursues law reform work
on behalf of an individual plaintiff or plaintiffs engaged in collective
work?
With one exception, this Article adopts the characterizations that
lawyers themselves selected to describe the type of client for whom
they worked.32 It generally does not treat the representation of indi-
viduals as collective litigation except where lawyers indicated that the
tasks they performed for their clients included "working on litigation
30. See Richard L. Abel, Lawyers and the Power to Change, 7 Law & Pol'y 5, 8
(1985) (asserting that "lawyers can help organizations to act autonomously by provid-
ing technical skills and training organization staff and members-a role reversal that
is difficult to attain with individual clients, no matter how well-intentioned the
lawyer").
31. The study included lawyers in several different practice settings, including
legal services, grass-roots clinics, civil rights firms, law firms not primarily devoted to
civil rights, law school clinics, and advocacy organizations.
To maintain confidentiality, citations to interviews refer to interview numbers
rather than attorneys' names. All interviews were conducted in Chicago, Illinois be-
tween June 18, 1993 and October 11, 1994. A second number is used in some citations
to the interviews to refer to the topic discussed.
32. With respect to each matter, lawyers were asked to fill out the following "re-
sponse sheet" indicating the type of client served:
TYPE OF CLIENT
1. Individual(s)
2. Plaintiff class
3. Defendant class
4. Service or advocacy organization
5. Religious organization
6. Non-profit corporation
7. For-profit corporation
8. Partnership
9. Other (specify)
1999] 2455
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
to change the law." In some matters in the latter category, lawyers
may have worked to change the law solely for the benefit of their
individual clients. 3 Many of the lawyers in this category, however,
indicated that they pursued individual claims with an eye toward sys-
temic effects-that they viewed their work as "impact litigation."
Therefore, this Article presents such matters as a type of collective
work.
Defined in this broad way, collective work constituted over two-
thirds of the 197 matters described by lawyers in this study. In thirty-
seven matters on behalf of individuals, lawyers said that law reform
was one of the purposes of the representation. Lawyers reported that
plaintiff classes were their clients in thirty-six matters.3 4 In sixty-four
matters, lawyers described the client as an organization.35 This latter
category comprised primarily formal organizations but also several
groups whose structure and processes were just beginning to take
shape.36
Even if the composition of collective representation in this study
differs from the makeup of civil rights and poverty practice elsewhere
in the United States, it calls into question the view that collective work
in civil rights and poverty practice proceeds primarily through class
action litigation, and it allows comparison among different types of
group representation. In this study, work on behalf of organizations
formed a much more prominent part of the collective dimension of
civil rights lawyering than class actions did.3 7 The class actions de-
scribed here were almost exclusively injunctive class actions rather
than small-claims damages actions, 3 and the classes were mostly un-
33. For an analysis of why class actions often benefit individual clients more than
individual suits would, see Failinger & May, supra note 4, at 17-18 (stating that law-
yers who file or threaten to file class actions often have more clout in negotiations
with defendants than they would if they pursued litigation on behalf of individual
clients, and that class actions are more likely to result in institutional reform, which
sometimes may be necessary to serve the individual client's interests).
34. In three of these class actions, there also was an organizational client. For
purposes of comparison, I have included these three matters in the category for plain-
tiff classes rather than organizations.
35. These organizations included 16 advocacy organizations, 10 service organiza-
tions, 20 economic development organizations, 2 church-related organizations, 5 for-
profit entities, 4 tenant organizations, and 7 coalitions, committees, and councils.
36. See, e.g., Interview 4,1 (explaining that tenant organization sought to change
"from a huge detached mass of residents to an organization that has a single voice and
a voting body and the ability to manage a building .... ); Interview 67,2 (represent-
ing schools' councils often included advising about "how to run a meeting, [and how
to] draft by-laws").
37. Cf. Yeazell, Collective Litigation, supra note 9, at 62 (arguing that litigation on
behalf of organizations "far exceeds, both in number and importance, the number of
suits formally certified as class actions").
38. But see Interview 51,1 (lawyer represented in a damages class action 1400 Afri-
can-American and Hispanic students who enrolled in a beauty school that never de-
livered any program).
[Vol. 672456
COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION
organized groups.3 9 Lawyers' reports about their roles in setting strat-
egy and about what their work achieved also indicate significant
differences in clients' decisionmaking functions and benefits achieved
by types of collective representation. 40 They suggest that organiza-
tions generally may be better able than plaintiff classes and individuals
to work with lawyers without surrendering control over their pur-
poses. They also show that organizations often pursue objectives as to
which the class action and law reform types of collective representa-
tion are irrelevant.
A. Client Autonomy
Where the clients were organizations, lawyers were more likely to
report that the client controlled the decisions about strategy than they
were in any other type of client representation. In only five percent of
matters in which the client was an organization did lawyers report
making strategy decisions alone or with little participation from the
client, as compared with ten percent of matters for individuals where
there was no law reform component, twenty-two percent of matters
for individuals where law reform litigation was part of the work, and
thirty-five percent of matters for plaintiff classes. Lawyers represent-
ing individuals in law reform litigation and lawyers handling class ac-
tions generally reported that they played more significant roles than
did lawyers representing organizations or individuals where there was
no law reform component.4 On a four-point scale, with "one" indi-
39. But see Interview 30,2 (parent advocacy organization participated in a class
action challenging the school system's right to test children for psychological
problems without parental consent); Interview 45,1 (tenant organization participated
in a class suit to improve conditions in a section 8 housing project); Interview 54,1
(tenant organization and a class of tenants in public housing challenged public hous-
ing conditions).
This finding is consistent with Yeazell's view that "[tihe class action is reserved for
collectivities that have not achieved organization; for them the class action offers the
possibility of achieving temporary, litigative organization." Yeazell, Collective Litiga-
tion, supra note 9, at 64.
40. Lawyers' own reports about their roles in setting strategy are not entirely reli-
able evidence of how they actually interacted with their clients. One can reasonably
assume that many lawyers would underestimate how much they directed strategy to
avoid seeming to transgress professional norms favoring client-centered decisionmak-
ing. However, one would expect such a bias to appear across types of clients served.
41. The interview questions about clients' roles in setting strategy included the
following:
Which best describes your role in the decision about what strategies to pur-
sue in this matter?
1. I did not participate; the client came to me with a clear strategy and asked
me to help implement it.
2. The client came to me with several alternative strategies and I helped the
client choose among them.
3. I played a significant role in helping the client identify options and select
among them.
1999] 2457
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cating that the client made all decisions and "four" indicating that the
lawyers made all strategy choices without participation by the client,
the average roles reported by lawyers were 2.6 where the client was an
organization, 3.0 where the client was an individual and there was no
law reform component, 3.2 where the client was an individual and the
project involved law reform, and 3.2 in plaintiff class actions.
These differences in lawyers' accounts of their roles in setting strat-
egy were consistent with these lawyers' narrative observations. Law-
yers for individuals often indicated that their clients looked to them as
experts who would tell them what to do,42 and lawyers who repre-
sented individuals in law reform cases sometimes indicated that their
strategy choices were influenced by law reform implications.4 3 Law-
yers for plaintiff classes typically reported that they set strategy largely
on their own." Lawyers for organizations generally described their
roles more narrowly. One lawyer observed, in characteristic fashion,
"my job is to define the parameters. '45 As to another matter, this
lawyer stated, "I don't think I played a significant role at all; I was a
sounding board, not a catalyst. '46 Lawyers who represented estab-
lished organizations commonly reported that their clients had formu-
lated their essential strategy before coming to the lawyer and that the
lawyer helped them refine and execute their plans.47
4. I made all decisions about strategy without participation by the client.
5. Other (specify)
42. See, e.g., Interview 19,2 ("[M]y client doesn't know much about how the sys-
tem works. By and large, [my clients] are pretty unsophisticated."); Interview 22,1
("Clients in large measure rely on you" because they are not experts and do not know
the system); Interview 47,1 ("She really didn't know what her options were."); Inter-
view 55,1 ("The client had no idea what to do."); Interview 63,3 (the client knew what
he wanted, "but he had no idea what was needed to achieve that"); Interview 64,3
("[F]or most clients, we're telling them about things they didn't know about before.").
43. See, e.g., Interview 33,3 ("I had no contact with the client here.... [Slince we
thought it was a worthwhile case, we appealed."); Interview 35,1 (lawyer who repre-
sented individuals in hate crimes prosecutions said, "We handle individual cases, but
we operate under the presumption that each is an impact case. We try to get benefits
for individual clients by getting the legal system to work for them, but we are also
interested in publicizing successes and deterring hate crimes by showing the price that
one can pay for committing them"); Interview 44,3 (lawyer never actually talked with
client about whether to appeal, but conferred with other lawyers); Interview 45,3 (in
explaining why he made all decisions about strategy, lawyer observed that the issue
on appeal was a pure question of law).
44. See, e.g., Interview 19,1 ("[T]here weren't many decisions [for the client class
to make] ...."); Interview 19,3 ("We told [the class representatives], 'these are your
options, and these are the ones we're willing to pursue."'); Interview 20,2 ("Our team
made virtually all the decisions."); Interview 60,1 ("The client played no role.").
45. Interview 26,1.
46. Interview 26,3.
47. See, e.g., Interview 31,1 ("Usually the deal [is] structured before it comes to
me."); Interview 41,1 ("They knew what they wanted to do. They had done a couple
of years of research and planning before they came to me."); Interview 52,1 ("With
respect to the client's overall strategy, the answer [to the question about their roles in
setting strategy] was 1; with respect to the plans for executing it, the answer was 3.");
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This study did not gather information necessary to explain these re-
ported differences in lawyers' roles by client type, but one might rea-
sonably conclude that structural attributes of these different types of
representation help explain those variations. The prominent role in
setting strategy described by lawyers in class actions is consistent with
scholarship analyzing accountability problems in class actions. Plain-
tiff classes ordinarily are-unorganized groups who do not exist before
or after the suit. In this study, for example, plaintiff classes included
inmates confined to segregation in the Illinois prisons, mothers of chil-
dren on AFDC, and children in Illinois state mental institutions. Class
representatives typically lack any direct accountability to the class
members they represent. Moreover, class actions lack formal proce-
dural mechanisms for assessing preferences of class members4" or for
holding accountable the attorneys who represent them.4 9 All but one
of the class actions in this study were injunctive class actions, in which
members of the class are not even entitled to notice of the action.50
Although courts are required to monitor the representation at the
class certification and settlement phases of the litigation, they often
exercise little independent scrutiny.5 As one lawyer in my study
noted, "the court never says, '[W]hat does your client think about
that, Mr. [X]?'" 52
Interview 57,3 ("I handled legal strategy, but they resolved huge issues regarding
whether to take risks on liability to serve inner city youth.").
48. See Ellmann, supra note 8, at 1118.
49. See id. ("The result of class action status may well be to empower groups of
people by facilitating their access to court, but the people so empowered are not em-
powered as against their lawyer."); Yeazell, Collective Litigation, supra note 9, at 45
("In many class actions the represented class member surrenders virtually all auton-
omy over the litigation."); cf Yeazell, From Group Litigation, supra note 4, at 1114-15
(noting that while lawyers in successful injunctive class actions sometimes recover
statutory attorney fees, injunctive class actions by definition do not involve damages
claims and therefore entrepreneurial lawyers do not compete aggressively to repre-
sent these classes).
50. Most class actions in this study were brought under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure Rule 23(b)(2), which allows for a class when "the party opposing the class has
acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to
the class as a whole." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Class actions brought under Rule
23(b)(1) and (2) do not require notice to class members, although the court must
order notice before approving any pretrial settlement. Id. Rule 23(b)(1), (b)(2), (e).
Damages class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(3) require individual notice to iden-
tifiable class members. Id. Rule 23(b)(3).
For an argument that Rule 23 has it backwards, see Yeazell, Front Group Litigation,
supra note 4, at 1110 ("Rule 23 seems to stand the world on its head, requiring assent
when one would be most confident that there was no arguable question about inter-
est, and dispensing with it just when the coincidence of interests is most debatable.").
51. See Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class Representation, and Fairness, 54 Ohio
St. LJ. 1, 7-8 (1993); see also Yeazell, From Group Litigation, supra note 4, at 1114-15
(1980) (noting that institutional reform litigators hold "the power to define the 'inter-
est' of the groups they represent; so long as their articulation of that interest does not
strike the court as entirely bizarre, it is likely to be sanctioned by class certification").
52. Interview 48.
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The influential roles of lawyers for individuals in this study is consis-
tent with other empirical evidence demonstrating that lawyers typi-
cally exercise substantial control in service to poor individuals and in
"personal plight" practice.53 Those who have tried to account for
these relatively high levels of control by lawyers representing poor
individuals have cited, on the one hand, clients' lack of confidence,
sophistication, and financial leverage and, on the other, lawyers' inter-
est in using scarce resources efficiently,54 their perception that clients
rely on them to set strategy, and, sometimes, their sense that poor
pay and working conditions entitle them to depart from conventional
client-centered norms.56
A variety of reasons might explain why lawyers in this study re-
ported that organizations played more significant roles in setting strat-
egy than plaintiff classes did. Most obviously, organizations, unlike
plaintiff classes, are capable of resolving internal disputes and generat-
ing strategy choices. Whereas classes ordinarily do not endure beyond
the suit, organizations exist before and after the representation and
they have extra-litigation mechanisms for ensuring that the organiza-
tions' leaders represent the interests of members.57 Unlike individual
members of a class, who generally are stuck with the position taken on
behalf of the class in injunctive class actions,58 individuals who are
53. See generally Douglas E. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge?
(1974) (examining the experiences of 60 personal injury plaintiffs and their lawyers);
Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Divorce Lawyers and Their Clients: Power and
Meaning in the Legal Process (1995) (examining lawyer-client relations in divorce
work); Carl J. Hosticka, We Don't Care What Happened, We Only Care About What Is
Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 Soc. Probs. 599 (1979)
(studying initial interviews with legal services clients and concluding that lawyers ex-
ercised considerable control).
54. See Eve Spangler, Lawyers for Hire: Salaried Professionals at Work 167
(1986) (concluding that the legal services lawyers she studied were "overworked, un-
derpaid, and harried" and that these pressures helped explain why these lawyers often
"cut short the consultative process in favor of simply giving orders to clients").
55. See Ann Southworth, Lawyer-Client Decisionmaking in Civil Rights and Pov-
erty Practice: An Empirical Study of Lawyers' Norms, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1101,
1109 (1996) ("Legal services lawyers reported that they played substantial roles in
defining clients' interests and selecting strategies, and that they did so because their
clients had no idea what to do and because clients had few or no alternatives to the
ones their lawyers recommended.").
56. See Spangler, supra note 54, at 166-70. Two lawyers in my study indicated that
they felt less constrained to defer to their clients when their clients did not pay. See
Interviews 26, 29.
57. Gronemeier writes:
The existence of an associational nexus between the members and their or-
ganizational representative gives the members a structural means to influence
and determine the representative's behavior. The availability of nonlegal
structural controls on the representatives suggests that the organizational
representation suit is more likely to further the interests of the members
than the class action suit.
Gronemeier, supra note 10, at 670 (emphasis added).
58. Dissenting class members are entitled under Rule 23 to challenge the ade-
quacy of the named plaintiffs' representation. Dissenting plaintiffs, however, often do
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disgruntled by the collective stance selected by an organization ordi-
narily may leave the group. 9 Organizations that fail to adequately
represent the views and interests of their members risk losing their
members' support.6° Thus, lawyers generally may defer to the group's
decisionmaking procedures because they ordinarily reflect choices by
individual members to commit themselves to the group. Moreover,
groups that are sufficiently well-organized to present themselves as
organizations may be better positioned than poor individuals to insist
on calling the shots vis-A-vis their lawyers.61
The much more circumscribed role for lawyers representing organi-
zations and the substantial roles played by lawyers representing indi-
viduals, particularly in law reform litigation, illustrate that there is
nothing inherent in collective projects to give lawyers excessive power
in their relationships with clients.62 Other structural factors, including
the clients' sophistication, capacity to make decisions, and control
over lawyers' compensation, may better predict whether clients will
play significant roles in setting strategy than whether they proceed
collectively. These differences in lawyer-client relationships reported
by lawyers in this study also suggest that any reforms directed toward
remedying perceived abuses in plaintiff class actions or law reform
work on behalf of individuals should not necessarily reach other types
of collective representation where lawyer control may be less
pervasive.
B. Strategies Pursued and Benefits Achieved
Lawyers in this study reported differences in the types of strategies
pursued and benefits achieved in different types of collective practice.
Individual clients and their lawyers were more likely than plaintiff
classes or organizations to pursue simple litigation rather than multi-
not have sufficient information or incentives to challenge their representation. See
Rhode, supra note 5, at 1215-16.
59. Yeazell comments:
Unlike the class, the organization has a system for bargaining over the
group's collective stance. Charters and bylaws, elections, steering commit-
tees, and organizational politics all provide forums to thrash out intra group
differences. In the extreme case, the individual member may part company;,
exit is always possible in voluntary organizations.
Yeazell, Collective Litigation, supra note 9, at 63.
60. See Gronemeier, supra note 10, at 668-69.
61. Sometimes organizations in civil rights and poverty practice pay their lawyers
and thereby hold financial leverage in the relationship. In this study, organizations
were far more likely than other types of clients to pay their lawyers: In 33% of mat-
ters for organizations, the clients paid fees (often reduced), as compared with 14% of
matters for individuals where there was no law reform purpose, 5% of law reform
matters for individuals, and 0% of matters for plaintiff classes.
62. Yeazell argues that we should expect individuals generally to exercise more
control where they are individual plaintiffs than in any type of collective litigation.
Yeazell, Collective Litigation, supra note 9, at 44.
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dimensional strategies. 63 The plaintiff classes in this study pursued the
only strategies they and their lawyers were capable of pursuing-liti-
gation and publicity. Since the class action is a form of representation
rather than a form of organization, plaintiff classes by definition could
not and did not pursue business planning, legislative projects, or ad-
ministrative advocacy. Organizations consumed ninety percent of the
facilitative services described by lawyers in this study. When organi-
zations pursued litigation, they generally pursued other strategies si-
multaneously; in eighty-six percent of matters involving litigation by
organizations, they pursued other strategies as well, as compared with
forty-six percent of litigation matters for individuals and sixty-nine
percent of matters for plaintiff classes.
Lawyers also reported differences in the types of benefits achieved
according to the types of client served. Lawyers for plaintiff classes
often reported that they had helped change an institution or changed
rules governing eligibility for, or the administration of, welfare bene-
fits.64 While they sometimes said that their work had helped educate
government officials about a problem, in only one class action in this
study did a lawyer report that his work had helped educate or mobil-
ize a constituency, 65 and in that matter a client organization had par-
ticipated in the litigation.66
Lawyers for organizations much less frequently reported that they
had helped reform an outside institution than did lawyers for plaintiff
classes. Unlike their class action counterparts, however, they often
63. In 45% of all matters where clients were individuals and there was no law
reform purpose, lawyers used single-pronged litigation, as compared to 38% of mat-
ters where the clients were individuals but there was a law reform purpose, 34% of
matters for plaintiff classes, and only 5% of matters for organizations.
64. See, e.g., Interview 19,1 (the state began devoting greater resources to the
AFDC system); Interview 20,2 (state redesigned the social services delivery system
for teen parents who are wards of state); Interview 26,2 (led to the demise of the
union leadership and to an increase in minority representation in the union); Inter-
view 30,1 (forced state to begin moving mentally retarded people who were misplaced
in geriatric nursing homes and created mechanism for protecting them); Interview
33,2 (1000 people received child care); Interview 48,1 (jail conditions have improved);
Interview 48,3 (mental health care has improved); Interview 50,3 (state has changed
its approach to serving teen parents); Interview 56,2 (hundreds of children who were
not formerly receiving child support awards are now receiving them); Interview 59,2
(improved state mental health care system); Interview 59,3 (improved the state's larg-
est state psychiatric hospital); Interview 60,1 (improved Cook County jail); Interview
61,1 (federal agency's employment practices are fairer); Interview 69,2 (gives "limited
English proficient" children procedures for ensuring that they receive adequate
education).
65. For articles exploring whether litigation can serve as a vehicle for organizing
constituencies, see Wexler, supra note 8, at 1058; Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the
Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
Change 535, 538-39 (1987-88).
66. See Interview 45,1 (in class action on behalf of tenant organization and class of
tenants, housing conditions improved and tenants became much more aware of their
rights and more willing to pursue them).
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said that they had helped a client group develop an organizational
structure or had helped an organization improve its operations. Many
of those who represented organizations in transactional work reported
that their work resulted in bricks and mortar accomplishments, such
as building or rehabilitating housing, child care, or recreational facili-
ties;67 in formalizing and consolidating small businesses;6s or in secur-
ing capital and other resources for such projects.69 They said that they
helped clients navigate daily impediments to their operation7' and, in
some cases, sought to remedy problems that threatened the organiza-
tions' very existence.7' They also reported that their work had helped
their clients become more sophisticated as organizations. 72 In their
advocacy work on behalf of organizations, lawyers frequently re-
ported that the work had influenced the legislative process73 or ener-
gized the group's members. 4
67. See, e.g., Interview 2,1 (will create 50 units of affordable housing); Interview
2,2 (clients rehabilitated dilapidated building and transformed it into decent, afforda-
ble housing); Interview 13,1 (client built housing for disabled people); Interview 14.2
(client acquired SRO hotels and converted them into housing and services for home-
less people); Interview 14,3 (client created a child care program); Interview 27,1 (will
result in the rehabilitation of a building where 200 families can live); Interview 31,2
(developed housing for 62 families).
68. See, e.g., Interview 8,1 (helped a Puerto Rican client acquire a small metal
fabricating business on an abandoned industrial site); Interview 27,3 (advised small
minority businesses about regulatory matters).
69. See, e.g., Interviews 4,14 (helped low-income housing developers devise fi-
nancing schemes to build low-income housing); Interview 6,2 (agreement with HUD
would give client the first crack at buying foreclosed properties at reduced prices);
Interview 13 (lawyer advised a client about how it might qualify for a City subsidy);
Interview 21,1 (loan program would help move capital into community).
70. See, e.g., Interview 5,1 (resolved dispute over taxes on leased computer equip-
ment); Interview 16,2 (represented organization in a suit by one of its ovn employ-
ees); Interview 16,3 (represented organization in a dispute with its landlord);
Interview 27,3 (represented small minority businesses on routine regulatory matters);
Interview 57,3 (helped an organization manage liability issues relating to its employ-
ees' interactions with youth); Interview 62,3 (provided general counsel services to a
large African-American service and advocacy organization).
71. See, e.g., Interview 4,2 (zoning authorities would have closed a not-for-profit
homeless shelter); Interview 51,3 (hospital serving an African-American community
sought to avoid closing following its bankruptcy filing).
72. See, e.g., Interview 4,1 (lawyer helped tenant management organizations func-
tion effectively as organizations and prepared them to qualify for funding from the
Chicago Housing Authority); Interview 6,1 (lawvyer's work would "enhance [client's]
efforts to move into new neighborhoods" and "enhance our lending efforts"); Inter-
view 16,1 ("Each time we work on something, we move on the learning curve" which
"makes the process smoother"); Interview 31,1 (next time client organization will ad-
dress lead paint issues before acquiring a building); Interview 36,1 (not-for-profit
housing developer became more sophisticated about how to acquire and finance the
rehabilitation of housing); Interview 41,1 (client achieved goal of becoming self-suffi-
cient on an operating basis).
73. See, e.g., Interview 53,2 (an education reform statute was adopted); Interview
62,1 (lawsuit kept schools open long enough to enable the legislature to act).
74. See, e.g., Interview 1,1 (zoning appeal on behalf of a church that sought to
shelter homeless people served a spiritual function for those involved); Interview 12,1
(helped a tenant organization coordinate a rent strike); Interview 23,3 (community
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These variations in types of work pursued and types of benefits se-
cured suggest that different types of collective representation may
serve different functions. In particular, they suggest that lawyers who
serve organizations are facilitating political organizing and institution
building in ways that lawyers for individuals and plaintiff classes gen-
erally are not.
II. LESSONS FOR LAWYERS' ETHics
Just as our procedural rules governing class actions may reflect am-
bivalence about when to allow collective litigation to proceed in our
resolutely individualistic legal system,75 current ethics doctrine offers
scattered bits of guidance about how lawyers should approach certain
types of collective representation without embracing any overarching
theory for managing problems of conflicts and accountability in collec-
tive work. The rules generally assume that the client is an individual
without squarely acknowledging that, more often than not, lawyers
represent groups rather than individuals. Moreover, as Stephen
Ellmann has shown, under current doctrine, deciding whether to char-
acterize one's representation as individual representation, intermedia-
tion, organizational representation, or class representation, is pivotal;
it leads to strikingly different guidelines for interacting with clients. 76
If one represents several individuals, the rules generally provide that
the lawyer owes a duty of loyalty and confidentiality to each of them
as individuals and that any conflict among them requires the lawyer to
withdraw from the representation of all.77 If the clients are individu-
als who seek to reach compromise that is in their collective interests,
in certain narrow circumstances the lawyer may function as an inter-
mediary and attempt to help them reach an agreement.78 If the client
is an organization, whether formal or not, the lawyer is charged with
representing that organization rather than any of its constituents, and
conflicts within the entity generally are to be resolved by reference to
the organization's internal structure.79 Where the organizational
structure is clear, this doctrine offers relatively simple answers about
groups have begun working with tenants to develop strategies for improving the
neighborhood); Interview 26,3 (has shown African-American firefighters' union that
they need to develop "staying power" and to acquire resources to accomplish that);
Interview 29,1 (clients have become more sensitive about the framework for redis-
tricting decisions).
75. See Yeazell, Collective Litigation, supra note 9, at 47-62 (asserting that the class
action doctrine reflects an uneasy compromise between the individualistic premises of
our legal system and concerns about the costs of litigation and problems of access).
76. Ellmann, supra note 8, at 1112-13.
77. The Model Rules bar a lawyer from representing anyone whose interests are
"materially adverse" to those of any client she had previously represented in "the
same or a substantially related matter" unless the client consents. Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.9(a) (1998).
78. See id. Rule 2.2(a), (c).
79. See id. Rule 1.13; Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 827.
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how lawyers should discern the client's interests and preferences; ordi-
narily, the lawyer looks to the officers for answers. Ethics doctrine,
however, offers little guidance about representing groups that are just
beginning to take shape and groups whose decision making processes
fail to protect those whom the organization is designed to serve. In
matters where the client organization lacks reliable internal govern-
ance procedures, lawyers are left to the ambiguous application of the
"entity" theory to a group whose interests may be difficult to discern,
whose constituencies may have conflicting interests, and/or whose
members cannot agree, or have not yet agreed, on mechanisms for
resolving disagreements."' In the area of representation most plagued
by conflicts and accountability problems-injunctive class actions-
the Model Code and the Model Rules have virtually nothing to say.81
This Article does not attempt to develop any uniform set of rules
regarding conflicts and accountability issues in the many different cir-
cumstances in which lawyers represent groups. To the contrary, it ar-
gues in favor of an approach that is sensitive to the actual practice
contexts in which lawyers work and to the pressures and constraints
that influence lawyer behavior. This Article sketches a general frame-
work for assessing conflicts and accountability in the various types of
collective work that lawyers pursue for poor people.
Would such an enterprise disserve poor people? Some scholars
have suggested that holding lawyers accountable for fairly represent-
ing groups in civil rights and poverty practice interferes with the goal
of enabling these lawyers to pursue effective collective work for the
poor. 2 William Simon describes as part of the "Dark Secret" of col-
lective practice that lawyers inevitably influence clients and suppress
conflict.83 It is in the very nature of collective projects, whether or-
ganizing tenants, bargaining on behalf of workers, or crafting new in-
stitutional arrangements for corporations, that individuals surrender
control to groups, and that the lawyers who represent groups neces-
sarily take sides in conflicts among the participants.' Simon argues
that professional responsibility doctrine has "tended to presume com-
80. See Elhmann, supra note 8, at 1139; Leubsdorf, supra note 3. at 828. For dis-
cussions of the difficulty of determining who speaks for the organization in corporate
practice, see Jonas, supra note 11, at 619; Reycraft, supra note 11. at 608.
81. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 2, at 319-40 (arguing that activist lawyers may
sometimes be justified in manipulating clients on behalf of a cause); Mark V. Tushnet,
The "Case or Controversy" Controversy, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1698, 1708-13 (1980) (as-
serting that in public interest litigation, lawyers should be accountable to the norm the
lawyer enforces but not necessarily to the individual client); see also Garth, supra note
4, at 493-94 (criticizing the view that, "if class actions most often lead to results that
comport with our notions of good public policy, we arguably need not worry about
occasional conflicts among members or between lawyers and class members, even if
those conflicts are not satisfactorily resolved").
83. Simon, Progressive Lawyering, supra note 12, at 1102-04.
84. See id. at 1102-11.
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mon interests for investors and managers organized as a corporation"
while it also has "tended to presume conflicting interests requiring
separate representation in situations involving individuals who were
not formally affiliated."8" In large class actions, Simon asserts, there
almost always are conflicts among members of the class, and lawyers
must necessarily make judgments about clients' interests because no
adequate measures are available for discerning actual client prefer-
ences.8 6 Lawyers for corporations face conflicts among the various
constituencies within the organization-employees, managers, and
shareholders. These intra-corporate conflicts, however, are "re-
solved" by laws equating the corporation's purposes with the share-
holders' interests.87 Ethics doctrine, in turn, directs lawyers to defer
to officers and the board, who are legally obligated to serve sharehold-
ers' interests and who incidentally also are responsible for hiring and
firing the organization's lawyers.88 Simon argues that emphasizing
conflicts of interest and difficulties in discerning the interests of mem-
bers of groups discourages poverty lawyers from pursuing collective
projects.89 Insisting on conflict-free lawyering for the poor, he asserts,
leaves poor people at a disadvantage as compared to their better-or-
ganized, wealthier counterparts, whose interests are served through
corporate entities and by corporate counsel who, in reliance on the
corporate entity doctrine, proceed with collective projects in the face
of such conflicts.90
85. William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469,
477 (1984) [hereinafter Simon, Visions of Practice] (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 479.
87. For arguments that corporations should be responsive to other constituencies,
see Christopher D. Stone, Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate
Behavior 88-118 (1975); and Joel F. Henning, Corporate Social Responsibility: Shell
Game for the Seventies?, in Corporate Power in America 151, 151-70 (Ralph Nader &
Mark J. Green eds., 1973). See also E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145, 1147-48 (1932) ("[Tjhe business corpora-
tion [is] an economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making
function .... "); William H. Simon, Contract Versus Politics in Corporation Doctrine,
in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 387, 394-402 (David Kairys ed., rev.
ed. 1990) (asserting that corporation doctrine today treats the social function of the
corporation as apolitical, in striking contrast to its treatment in public discourse
throughout the nineteenth century as a set of economic arrangements affecting not
just lenders, investors, and managers, but also other constituencies and the larger
society).
88. See Stephen Gillers, Model Rule 1.13(c) Gives the Wrong Answer to the Ques-
tion of Corporate Counsel Disclosure, 1 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 289, 304 (1987) ("One
need not be a professional cynic to discover in Rule 1.13 a resolution that will ingrati-
ate lawyers to the very corporate officers who decide the terms and conditions of their
employment or retainers, predictable costs to the client notwithstanding."); Leub-
sdorf, supra note 3, at 828 (observing that treating the board and officers as the cor-
poration's proper representatives "reinforces the power of the individuals who hire
the lawyers-the officers and the board").
89. Simon, Visions of Practice, supra note 85, at 478-82.
90. Simon writes:
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This Article acknowledges inevitable problems of representative-
ness and conflicts in certain types of collective representation of poor
people while also advocating that we hold lawyers responsible for dis-
cerning conflicts and for responding to them. As Simon has observed,
the premise that lawyers should respect individual autonomy can be
useful in "inhibit[ing] the lawyer's instinct toward arrogance or pater-
nalism."'" Moreover, much of what lawyers do on behalf of groups of
poor people involves no significant conflicts. As Simon acknowledges
and as the data in this study illustrate, many collective projects are
largely voluntary.9z Even if many large organizations, including many
national unions, cannot support themselves without using coercion or
sanction to maintain organizational discipline,93 lawyers who repre-
sent smaller organizations with well-defined decisionmaking struc-
tures and easy means of exit generally need not engage in coercive
tactics. Implementing the decisions of the organization often simply
means deferring to the choices of individuals to submit to the deci-
sions of the group.94 In projects involving the "moral and practical
problems" that Simon identifies with collective practice, such as law
reform on behalf of individuals, class actions, the representation of
large unions, and work on behalf of nascent client groups whose inter-
nal governing procedures are not yet defined, lawyers should be ac-
countable for the balance they strike between individuals and groups
and between different constituencies within the group. Asking law-
yers to attempt both to respect individuals' choices to make connec-
tions by participating in groups and to seek to "limit the intrusions on
individual autonomy that group interactions generate"' need not dis-
courage lawyers from pursuing collective work for poor people so
long as the standards we set are reasonable.
The bar has rationalized loyalty to established organizations by treating the
organizations as persons entitled to personal care and trust. It has rational-
ized opposition to collective action by the disadvantaged by treating each
participant as an isolated individual with personal interests which would be
betrayed by any effort to achieve power by joining with others.
William H. Simon, Hono Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 Stan.
L. Rev. 487, 503 (1980); cf. Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 826 ("Referring to large orga-
nizations as 'the client' and 'the lawyer' enables the speaker to cast over them the aura
of personal rights and personal service that traditionally accompanies the troubled
client seeking help from a trusted lawyer.").
91. Simon, Progressive Lawyering, supra note 12, at 1107.
92. Id. at 1111 ("It may be, as some post-modernists have suggested, that the na-
ture of progressive political activism is changing in ways that make the traditional
preoccupations of coercion and incentives obsolete." (citing Pauline Marie Rosenau,
Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences 144-55 (1992))).
93. See Richard Lempert & Joseph Sanders, Law and Social Science 339-47
(1986); Olson, supra note 7, at 9-16.
94. See id. at 33-34 (concluding that "certain small groups can provide themselves
with collective goods without relying on coercion or any positive inducements apart
from the collective good itself").
95. Ellmann, supra note 8, at 1107.
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Requiring lawyers to be accountable to clients and to respond to
conflicts within groups may require different approaches for different
types of collective representation, because the opportunities, pres-
sures, and constraints of these various types of practice vary signifi-
cantly. This study illustrates that, even within civil rights and poverty
practice, groups differ substantially in their accountability to their own
members and in their lawyers' power with respect to the groups. In
law reform work on behalf of individuals, clients often have little lev-
erage with lawyers who wish to pursue the cause at the expense of the
client.96 Moreover, the constituencies on behalf of whom lawyers
seek to change the law generally have no way of registering their pref-
erences because they lack any formal relationship with the lawyer.97
In large injunctive class action litigation, the absence of formal mecha-
nisms for discerning the preferences of class members and the inade-
quacy of current procedures for protecting the interests of dissenters
give lawyers enormous power and responsibility to define the client's
interests and to set strategy. As one lawyer in my sample observed,
"It's very easy to ... lose touch with your clients, and then you be-
come your client .... [I]t's very easy to fall into this practice of not
talking to clients and then just making all the decisions for clients."98
Lawyers who represent groups that are just taking shape and selecting
methods for making decisions engage in a delicate task, because these
clients often depend heavily on their lawyers' advice99 and because
such fledgling organizations may be vulnerable to hijacking by willful
leaders. 100 Lawyers who represent groups whose decisionmaking
structures give real voice to their members' deliberations and gui-
dance to their lawyers about how to implement their collective pur-
poses have less opportunity and justification for substituting their own
goals and strategies. Even when those processes are not perfectly
democratic, decisions generated by those procedures generally reflect
arrangements agreed upon by participants in the group.'
96. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text; see also Breger, supra note 1, at
349 (stating that in law reform work on behalf of disadvantaged individuals, "there
are no constraints on an attorney's behavior except those which he chooses to impose
upon himself").
97. See Hegland, supra note 1, at 805-06; McMunigal, supra note 9, at 805-19.
98. Interview 48.
99. Ellman writes:
The lawyer should, I suggest, be particularly protective of the autonomy of
individual members when the lawyer herself brought their group into exist-
ence.... [T]he danger that a skilled and sympathetic professional may even
inadvertently push people into associations they would not otherwise have
accepted puts the lawyer who gave such advice under a duty to monitor its
results.
Ellmann, supra note 8, at 1134 n.87.
100. See id. at 1151 (noting that the lawyer for an inchoate group must ensure that
he does not become "the ally of leaders who are usurping power over their members"
(citation omitted)).
101. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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In recent years, a number of different commentators have urged
that lawyers' ethics should take into account differences in the con-
texts in which lawyers practice. 102 This Article suggests that any move
toward clarifying lawyers' obligations in collective practice should
take into account structural differences in various types of collective
representation. With respect to another set of ethical issues-external
questions about how lawyers should balance their responsibilities to
clients against their responsibilities to third parties and the public-
Wiliam Simon advocates a model of ethics according to which lawyers
"attempt to reconcile the conflicting legal values implicated directly in
the client's claim or goal.' 10 3 One of the variables he asks lawyers to
consider is whether procedural mechanisms available for evaluating
the client's proposed course of conduct are reliable: "[T]he more reli-
able the relevant procedures and institutions, the less direct responsi-
bility the lawyer need assume for the substantive justice of the
resolution; the less reliable the procedures and institutions, the more
direct responsibility she need assume for substantive justice."' Ap-
plying a similar criterion to an internal question about lawyer account-
ability-how to assess the client's interest and how to balance the
interests of conflicting constituencies within the group-lawyers' eth-
ics should consider the reliability of the procedures by which decisions
will be made for the group, or in the case of formal organizations, for
the natural persons who are the group's beneficiaries. 0 5 The more
reliable the decisionmaking structures and opportunities for exit by
individual members, the less direct responsibility the lawyer should
bear for discerning the interests and preferences of the group's mem-
bers and responding to evidence of dissent within the group."'
Applying this framework to the types of collective representation
illustrated in this study yields the following basic guidelines for assess-
ing clients' interests and resolving conflicts. Lawyers representing in-
dividuals in law reform litigation should be permitted to represent
individuals whose interests and preferences coincide with their own
102. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
103. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L Rev. 1083,
1096 (1988).
104. Id. at 1097-98.
105. Pope asserts that labor unions are fundamentally different from corporations
in this sense. While shareholders in corporation doctrine are treated as the natural
persons who are the beneficiaries of corporate functions, union members are the nat-
ural persons for whom unions conduct their activities. Pope argues, therefore, that
the entity doctrine should not govern all conflicts within the organization, particularly
union members' disputes with union management. Pope, supra note 3, at 52-55.
106. Pope has applied a similar framework in concluding that, while union leaders
generally may be counted on to represent their members' interests in disputes with
third parties, union lawyers may not always defer to union officials in disputes be-
tween unions and their members. He notes that union members, unlike corporate
shareholders who can easily express their disapproval of management policies by sell-
ing their shares, often cannot escape the union's influence or their obligations to pay
dues without abandoning their jobs. Id. at 29-30.
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law reform commitments, but they generally should serve their clients'
ends at the expense of law reform if those purposes diverge," 7 and
they should not purport to represent the constituency of affected per-
sons, who have no recourse against the lawyer. In class actions, law-
yers should exercise ethical sensitivity in discharging their largely
unconstrained role as class counsel.10 8 They should attempt to under-
stand and to represent the interests of the members of the class and be
attentive to conflicts within the class.' 0 9 Lawyers representing organi-
zations whose decisionmaking structures are well-defined and from
which members can easily exit generally may defer to decisions gener-
ated by those processes," 0 except where they believe that those who
107. Several lawyers in this study acknowledged that they had faced conflicts be-
tween their own law reform commitments and their clients' preferences, but all of
those who indicated that they had such conflicts said that they resolved the conflict in
favor of the client. See, e.g., Interview 32,1 (lawyer who sued police for refusing to
protect an African-American family who had moved into a hostile white neighbor-
hood was disappointed when the family chose to move rather than to fight, but the
lawyer deferred to the family's judgment that their children's safety should take prior-
ity over the fair housing principle); Interview 32,2 (lawyer who represented a plaintiff
in a lending discrimination case said that "a sore point" between his client and him
had been his client's decision to seek only money damages and no broader relief from
the defendant bank); Interview 54,2 (lawyer was disappointed when his client chose to
accept a monetary settlement because he thought they would win at trial).
McMunigal has argued that requiring the lawyer to defer to the client whenever the
client's interest and law reform goals diverge demands more than we can reasonably
expect of cause lawyers. McMunigal, supra note 9, at 815-16. McMunigal advocates
allowing lawyers to negotiate with clients to pursue law reform objectives at the cli-
ent's expense, so long as the lawyer adequately discloses the choice to the client and
the client consents to proceed on those terms. Id. at 817-18. He argues that the public
dimension of law-"the generation of precedent, development of the law, and the
application of public values in resolving disputes"-is in some respects analogous to
the advancement of medical research. Id. at 816 (citation omitted). Even if client and
patient interests generally should take precedence over collective goals in legal and
medical practice, clients and patients should be able to choose whether or not to allow
their cases to be used for collective purposes. See id.
108. Bell has argued that civil rights lawyers must "come to realize that the special
status accorded them by the courts and the bar demands in return an extraordinary
display of ethical sensitivity and self-restraint." Bell, supra note 12, at 505.
109. David Luban has persuasively argued that problems of class conflicts "require
the lawyer to be as representative as it is possible to be." Luban, supra note 2, at 356.
For arguments specifying how lawyers might discern conflicts and how courts should
respond to them, see Lawrence M. Grosberg, Class Actions and Client-Centered Deci-
sionmaking, 40 Syracuse L. Rev. 709, 714 (1989) (arguing that "because ... no indi-
vidual client... can determine the course of a class action, it is doubly important that
a class lawyer reach out to a sampling of class members to ascertain its views and
feelings on a variety of non-legal considerations about which only clients should voice
opinions"); Rhode, supra note 5, at 1255-56 (suggesting that we liberalize intervention
procedures in institutional reform litigation).
110. I agree with Stephen Ellmann that most of the groups with which lawyers will
interact in civil rights and poverty work will accept democratic values. Ellmann, supra
note 8, at 1133. That conclusion, however, is not essential to this analysis. Individuals
often choose to join organizations in which their opinions are not highly valued. So
long as individuals who join such organizations have real opportunities to exit, law-
yers may represent these organizations without trampling on individual autonomy.
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speak for the organization are abusing the trust of the organization's
intended beneficiaries.111 Organizations of poor people, no less than
corporations, generally should benefit from the presumption that the
entity, rather than its individual members, is the client. 112 In groups
without any formal decisionmaking apparatus, lawyers should help cli-
ents develop democratic processes for generating decisions. 1 3
This focus on the structure of relationships between lawyers and
groups and between groups and their members in civil rights and pov-
erty practice highlights how organizations sometimes can function as
mediating institutions through which lawyers facilitate collective ac-
tion without attempting to define clients' interests." 4 Scholars have
written extensively during recent years about the virtues of voluntary
organizations. Commentators from both the left and the right em-
brace community organizations as vehicles for delivering social serv-
ices and structuring civic life.' A large body of recent research
suggests that participation in local organizations powerfully improves
communities' prospects for bettering schools, reducing crime, and pro-
moting economic development." 6 Proponents of organizations also
applaud the ways in which collective processes shape individual par-
ticipants' perceptions of their own interests and distill them through
the lens of collective goals." 7
111. This is the general approach set forth in Model Rule 1.13. This rule, however,
does not go far enough in protecting the organization against abuses by management.
When the lawyer believes that management is engaged in self-dealing at the corpora-
tion's expense, Rule 1.13 requires the lawyer to "refer [the] matter to higher author-
ity" in the organization. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13 cmt. (1998).
If the board ratifies the misconduct, however, then the lawyer's only recourse is to
resign without disclosing the misconduct. For strongly critical analyses of this resolu-
tion, see Gillers, supra note 88, at 297-305; James I McCall, The Corporation as
Client Problems, Perspectives, and Partial Solttions, 39 Hastings L.J. 623, 637-39
(1988).
112. For an argument that building and maintaining organizations is more difficult
for relatively powerless people than for the more powerful, see Claus Offe, Disorga-
nized Capitalism 170-220 (John Keane ed., 1985).
113. See Ellmann, supra note 8, at 1116-18.
114. Stephen Wexler made this point almost 30 years ago: "[The lawyer] can be
another hook on which poor people depend, or he can help the poor build something
which rests upon themselves-something which cannot be taken away and which will
not leave until all of them leave." Wexler, supra note 8, at 1053-54.
115. See Peter L. Berger & Richard J. Neuhaus, To Empower People: The Role of
Mediating Structures in Public Policy 34-40 (1977); Sara M. Evans & Harry C. Boyte,
Free Spaces: The Sources of Democratic Change in America 184-87 (1992); Robert
Fisher, Let the People Decide: Neighborhood Organizing in America 153-66 (1984).
116. See Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: Amnerica's Declining Social Capital, 6 J.
Democracy 65, 66-67 (1995).
117. Cf. Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493, 1503 (1988) (-In the
strongest versions of republicanism.... [plolitical engagement is considered a positive
human good because the self is understood as partially constituted by, or as coming to
itself through, such engagement."); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
97 Yale LJ. 1539, 1541, 1548-51 (1988) (describing republican conceptions of politics
"as above all deliberative" and directed toward "achiev[ing] a measure of critical dis-
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This Article adds one more item to the list of organizations' virtues.
Unlike class actions and law reform litigation, which impose few struc-
tural constraints on lawyers' conduct, organizations generally have in-
ternal mechanisms for resolving conflict and generating decisions
binding on their lawyers. Unlike the members of injunctive plaintiff
class actions and beneficiaries of reform litigation, who may constitute
a group only in the limited sense that they share certain attributes as
victims, 8 members of small organizations share voluntary bonds;
they generally have chosen to join groups and to participate as mem-
bers.119 Class action lawsuits and law reform litigation on behalf of
individuals have the advantage of allowing the enforcement of collec-
tive rights without the hard work of organizing. 120 Indeed, it may be
almost impossible to organize some of the disparate groups whose in-
terests these devices sometimes promote. 2 1 Nevertheless, organiza-
tions can protect dissenters and generate consensus in ways that class
actions and impact litigation on behalf of individuals cannot.
CONCLUSION
Lawyers for poor people often serve groups rather than individuals.
Yet, our conceptions of ethical lawyering draw primarily from models
of service to individuals. Critics of lawyers for poor people often
equate collective representation with class action litigation and other
types of impact litigation as to which structural attributes of the
groups represented and their relationships with their lawyers create
serious problems of conflicts and accountability. This Article illus-
trates that collective representation for poor people often takes the
form of representing organizations, where conflicts and lawyer ac-
countability issues generally are much less worrisome and where the
goals pursued may differ from those ordinarily sought through law re-
form work. Any move toward revising ethics doctrine to acknowledge
that lawyers routinely serve groups rather than individuals should be
sensitive to these important differences in types of collective represen-
tation. In a time when critics often suggest that lawyers threaten cli-
tance from prevailing desires and practices, subjecting these desires and practices to
scrutiny and review").
118. See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term: Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1979) (asserting that the group of victims in structural
suits "exists independently of the lawsuit; it is not simply a legal construct").
119. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a His-
tory of the Class Action, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 866, 868-91 (1977) (tracing the history of
class action suits in litigation on behalf of more cohesive, organic social groups).
120. See Marc Galanter, Delivering Legality: Some Proposals for the Direction of
Research, 11 L. & Soc'y Rev. 225, 240 (1976) ("The class action may also be thought
of as a device for securing the benefits of scale without undergoing the outlay for
organizing.").
121. See Joel F. Handler, Social Movements and the Legal System: A Theory of
Law Reform and Social Change 6 (1978).
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ent autonomy whenever they depart from the most humble types of
individual client service, we should avoid discouraging lawyers from
helping clients build organizations and institutions serving clients' col-
lective as well as individual needs.
Notes & Observations
